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This paper explores the role of civic culture in expanding scal ca-
pacity by developing a model based on reciprocal obligations; citizens
pay their taxes and the state provides public goods. Civic culture
evolves over time according to the relative payo¤ of civic-minded and
materialist citizens. A strong civic culture manifests itself as high
tax revenues sustained by high levels of voluntary tax compliance and
provision of public goods. This captures the idea of government as
a reciprocal social contract between the state and its citizens. The
paper highlights the role of political institutions and common interests
in the emergence civic culture.
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1 Introduction
One of the most striking features of twentieth century economic history was
the increase in the capacity of states to raise signicant revenues as a share
of national income. At the turn of the century, very few advanced countries
raised in excess of 10% of GDP in the form of tax revenues. Yet, by the last
quarter of the century a tax take of around 40% was not uncommon. This
expansion in revenues has enabled governments around the world to expand
the scope of their activities from a predominant concern with national defence
and infrastructure to high levels of public funding for health care, education,
pensions and income transfers.
But this change in the nature of government is of much greater signicance
than is suggested by data on public revenues and spending alone. Raising
substantial tax revenues requires transformative economic, political and so-
cial changes which was emphasized in Schumpeter (1918), a foundational
essay in the history of scal sociology, when he notes that:
the scal history of a people is above all an essential part of
its general history. An enormous inuence on the fate of nations
emanates from the economic bleeding which the needs of the state
necessitates, and from the use to which the results are put.
In short, the power to tax is at the heart of creating an e¤ective state.
This paper develops a model to illustrate the role of civic culture in
building an e¤ective scal state. Tax compliance is a¤ected by the civic-
mindedness of citizens and by the composition of government spending, i.e.
public goods versus transfers. The latter is a¤ected by the value of public
goods and the cohesiveness of political institutions. Civic culture evolves
over time reecting the relative payo¤s of civic-minded and materialistic cit-
izens. The paper gives conditions under which this leads to an increase in
scal capacity. Despite the specic modelling assumptions, the ideas devel-
oped in the paper are of wide applicability in understanding the historical
emergence of e¤ective states.
The approach taken here di¤ers from the typical starting point for eco-
nomic studies of government policy which assume that governments are en-
dowed with su¢ cient power to tax, regulate and enforce laws. The main
focus is then on how policy measures are deployed in theory and practice.1
1See, for example, the classic texts such as Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) on taxation
and public spending, or La¤ont and Tirole (1993) on regulation.
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Only recently has there been a systematic investigation of how state capaci-
ties are acquired in the rst place, feeding o¤ an increased recognition that
di¤erences in state e¤ectiveness across the world and over time are strikingly
large.2 At one end of the spectrum, are the highly functional states of Scan-
dinavian countries many of which combine functioning market economies
with social provision of a range of goods and services. At the other end
of the spectrum are so-called fragilestates, many of which are located in
Africa and the Middle-East, and struggle to maintain law and order and to
deliver even the most basic services to their citizens.
The framework developed here is able to isolate a range of factors which
determine scal capacity. It highlights, in particular, the complementarity
between the strength of institutions and a quasi-voluntary tax compliance as
emphasized in Levi (1988). This emphasizes that institutional and cultural
explanations of the emergence of a strong scal state are complements. The
model also generates a range of novel insights into the factors which shape
how civic culture develops in the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses areas of related research along with some suggestive evidence from
the World Values Survey. Section three develops the core model. Section
four studies optimal policy and cultural dynamics and section ve develops
implications of di¤erent ways of creating stronger common interests between
citizens and elites. Section six explores some additional issues while section
seven concludes. Proofs and some technical details are in the Appendix.
2 Background
State E¤ectiveness, Reciprocity and Social Order The state is the
central institution for maintaining social order in large and complex societies.
This paper is related to long-standing debates about how to build an e¤ective
state that can tax, spend and regulate markets. This links a wide range of
literature in political philosophy and the social sciences.
There are two broad views of the origins of e¤ective states. The rst is
often associated with Hobbes (1651) and regards the sine qua non of state
e¤ectiveness to be the projection of coercive power. This sees the problem of
state e¤ectiveness as building organizational structures which allow the state
to extend its reach and coerce citizens into complying with its diktats. This
2See Besley and Persson (2011) for an outline of some of the main ideas.
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means creating a system of formal enforcement of legal rules and payment of
taxes. Doing so requires purposeful investment by state actors of the kind
modeled in Besley and Persson (2009, 2011) who consider the power to tax
(scal capacity) and the power to enforce property rights and regulate a mar-
ket economy (legal capacity). They propose a model in which policy-makers
weigh up the costs and benets of investing in state capacities. Incentives
to do so depend on how far state power is used to pursue common interests
which is facilitated by having more cohesive institutions. Their approach
rhymes well with that taken in, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
and North and Weingast (1989) who both see constraints on state power as
essential to establishing e¤ective government.3
The second view emphasizes the state as a social contract and has its
origins in a range of inuential thinkers. For example, Locke (1690) and
Rousseau (1762) argue that civil and political rights constitute a form of
exchange where a citizen accepts obligations in return for benevolent govern-
ment. If a government fails to deliver such policies, then citizens can legiti-
mately withdraw their cooperation and/or actively seek leadership change.4
A crucial feature of these theories is that they extend the idea of reciprocity
in small-scale societies to apply to state-citizen relations.5 The contractarian
view gives a central role to reciprocal obligation in establishing an e¤ective
state and lies at the heart of Levi (1988)s inuential historical analysis of
the power to tax. She argues that curtailing state predation has historically
played a role in encouraging what she calls quasi-voluntary compliance
with the state.
A number of economists have explored a contractarian approach to gov-
ernment. For example, Buchanan (1975) argues that rules should be de-
signed so as to constrain government intervention to those things which com-
3They also see benets from the extension of power beyond the initial elite, the king for
North and Weingast (1989), the nobles and landed aristocrats for Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012).
4They did how ever draw somewhat di¤erent conclusions from their approaches with
Locke believing in limited, representative government while Rousseau believed in direct
government by the people. They also recognize coercion as essential althiough they dont
give it primacy of place the way that Hobbes did.
5Page 5 of Lessno¤ (1986) suggests that the model of a contract in social contract
theory is one of reciprocal, conditional promises and obligations.He also stresses the
central role of voluntarism in political obligation and makes a distincton between what
he calls trust-basedtheories and contract-based theories where only the latter stresses
reciprocal obligation.
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mand universal assent following the ideas of Wicksell (1896). This requires
procedural and constitutional rules which are self-enforcing, an issue that is
explored in Weingast (1997, 2005) in a repeated game setting. Kotliko¤ et
al. (1988) explore how a social contract can be sustained when there is a
commitment problem between overlapping generations of citizens. Binmore
(1994, 1998) explores a social contract in a world of repeated interactions
sustaining cooperation and Acemoglu (2005) uses a similar approach to
characterize when a consensually strong statewill emerge. In many of
these approaches, reciprocity between citizens and the state is a feature of
equilibrium play.
This paper takes an approach based on what Sobel (2005) calls intrinsic
reciprocity where the forces that shape reciprocal behavior are internalized
in preferences.6 There is signicant evidence to underpin this view, mainly
from lab experiments. For example, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003), Fehr and
Gaechter (2000) and Dohmen et al (2009) suggest that reciprocity comes in
two main forms: positive reciprocity where one agent who takes an action to
benet another agent encourages a benecial act in return and negative reci-
procity when one agent is willing to use a costly punishment when another
agent transgresses. Social contract models of the state leverage these ideas
to explore state-citizen relations, particularly citizens obligations to obey the
law and to comply with taxes and empirical studies linking tax compliance
to the delivery of public services such as Fjeldstad and Semboja (2000) and
Levi and Sacks (2009). Slivinski and Sussman (2019) emphasise a combina-
tion of perceptions of fairness and use of local information in tax compliance
in medieval Paris. Weigel (2018) nds evidence for the relevance of concerns
about legtimacy in a eld experiment which links tax compliance and percep-
tions of legitimacy. Feld and Frey (2007) emphasize that compliance will be
higher when the government is perceived to be fair which has parallels with
the wider psychological literature on legitimacy and compliance (for example
Tyler, 2006).
Notions of reciprocity run deep in human societies and have been stud-
ied by economists and anthropologists in many di¤erent settings.7 Trivers
(1971) argues that it has a biological basis shaped by species cooperating to
resist predators and to raise their o¤spring. Bowles and Gintis (2004, 2011)
6See also Kolm (2008) who identies di¤erent forms of reciprocity and explores their
implications. He also discusses forces driving the cultural evolution of reciprocity.
7See, for example, Popkin (1979) and Scott (1976) for discussion of the role of reci-
procity in village economies and Oliver (2019) for a discussion of its policy implications.
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also take a biological view of reciprocity, emphasizing the tness advantages
that it brings to groups. Reciprocity can also emerge from cultural evolution
along the lines of Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man (1981). Such ideas have been incorporated into economic settings, for
example by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Tabellini (2008). Here, we adopt
an indirect evolutionary process applied to preferences following Güth and
Yaari (1992) where norms, customs and values are internalized in preferences.
This has been applied by Sethi and Somanathan (2001), Dekel et al. (2012)
and Alger and Weibull (2013) among others.
The ideas in this paper are also linked to a tradition in political science
that sees the emergence of a strong civic culture as the bedrock of successful
polities. This idea has a long heritage beginning with Montesquieu (1748).
In a more contemporary incarnation, American political scientists such as
Lipset (1960) and Almond and Verba (1963) emphasized the importance
of values underpinning the successful operation of government institutions.
Such ideas also lie behind Putnam (1988)s account of a functional democracy
supported by social capital. Besley and Persson (2018) develop a model
where there is coevolution between the values that support democracy and
institutions. The paper is also linked to a range of contributions in economics
which explain economic success and failure in terms of cultural factors (see,
for example, Algan and Cahuc, 2013, Collier 2017, Guiso et al. 2006 for
overviews of di¤erent aspects). Finally, there is an emerging literature that
links norms, values and politics such as Lindbeck et al. (1999) and Besley
and Persson (2019a,b).
Fiscal Capacity and Tax Compliance It is well-known that the tax
take in GDP varies both cross-sectionally and over time. Figure 1, which
is taken from Besley and Persson (2013), gives an overview of these trends,
looking at the historical picture over time during the last 100 years based
on a sample of 18 countries using data from Mitchell (2007).8 It shows
that taxation has increased over time from around a 10% share in national
income to around 25%. The gure also illustrates the increasing importance
of income taxation which only made up about 5% of revenues in 1900 but
8The countries in the sample are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The sample is selected, as we are
reasonably condent that the data are comparable across countries and time in Mitchell
(2007).
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increased to around 50% by the end of the last century. These increases in
income taxation are particularly striking during the two world wars.9
Figure 1 about here
Three dimensions the economic, political and social are invoked to explain
the observed increase in taxation as a share of GDP.
On the economic side, demand-based factors include waging war as em-
phasized, for example, by Tilly (1990) as well as increases in the demand
for (income elastic) public services. On the supply side, structural change
in the economy mean that governments can more easily collect tax revenue.
Thus, formal employment contracts allow cross-reporting on tax liabilities
to the government (see Kleven et al. (2016) and Jensen (2019)). Increased
use of VAT and income taxation both make use of the rm as a nexus of
compliance.
When it comes to politics, state centralization and constraints on power
are important as emphasized in Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), Besley et
al. (2013) and Dincecco, (2011, 2015) and Stasavage (2003, 2011). Increas-
ing use of elections has fuelled growth in demand for social insurance and
publicly-funded health care and education.
Among social factors, Schumpeter (1918) emphasized taxation as an ex-
pression of obligation. And Levi (1988) argues that building state capacity
is made feasible by creating quasi-voluntary compliance. This is related to
the idea that the legitimacy of the state is increasing alongside greater trust
in state institutions.10
These factors are reected in economic models of tax compliance. Fol-
lowing Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the canonical approach focuses on the
threat of material sanctions as the primary driver of tax-compliance decisions.
It predicts that better detection and monitoring, coupled with higher nes,
9Using data on the same 18 countries used to construct Figure 1, Besley et al. (2013)
show (using ve year averages at the country level for the 20th century) that there is a
robust correlation between participating in external wars and having strong constraints
on the executive as measured in the PolityIV data. These correlations remain even when
country xed-e¤ects are included in the regression and when income per capita is used as
a control.
10Levi et al. (2007) posit that legitimacy it has roots in two key complementary el-
ements: trustworthiness of government and procedural justice. Braithwaite and Levi,
(1998) discusses a range of perspectives on building trust in government and its link to
government e¤ectiveness.
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are the key elements in building scal capacity. Besley and Persson (2009,
2014) and Besley et al (2013) model scal capacity building as investing in
better monitoring and compliance.
The importance of these elements of tax compliance notwithstanding, it
is now widely accepted that it is incomplete and a wider set of considerations
underpin decisions to pay taxes. Collectively these approaches, invoke the
term tax morale to capture a range of reasons for paying taxes (see, for
example, Torgler (2007) and Luttmer and Singhal (2014) for discussion).
The model developed is directly related to this literature; tax morale evolves
endogenously over time.
Evidence from the World Values Survey /European Values Survey
Some clues on the determinants of voluntary tax compliance can be found in
attitudinal data. For example, both the World Values Survey and European
Values Survey contains a question to its respondents as follows: "Is it justi-
able to cheat on your taxes if you have a chance?" with the responses coded
on a 10 point scale. It has been asked 103 countries with six survey waves
of the World Values Survey countries and one wave of the European Values
Survey with answers available from around 335,000 individual respondents
in repeated cross-sections. Across the sample, around 58% of the population
think that cheating is never justiable. Although we focus on within-country
variation, it is worth noting that there are large di¤erences across countries
For convenience of interpretation, we reverse this ten point scale so that
the highest value denotes believing that cheating on taxes is never justied,
i.e. a positive attitude towards compliance. We denote the variable of interest
by aicw for respondent i in country c in survey wave w. The data can be
described by running a regression of the following form:
aicw = αc + αw + βxicw + εicw (1)
where {αc, αw} are country and wave dummies, xicw are individual character-
istics for which we include age (in three bands), gender (as dummy variable)
education (in three bands) and income (in ten bands). These correlations
therefore exploit only within-country variation in responses. The standard
errors are clustered at the country level.
Table 1 about here
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The results from (1) are in Table 1. In column (1), the Table shows
that having a positive attitude towards compliance is related to individual
characteristics; it is decreasing in income, increasing in education and age
and less prevalent among men.
More directly related to the ideas that follow, attitudes towards justi-
able cheating can be correlated with an individuals subjectively reported
condence in government based on a question where the respondent is asked
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell
me how much condence you have in them: is it a great deal of condence,
quite a lot of condence, not very much condence or none at all?. We
use the answers as applied to the government in the capital city and code
the answer as equal to one if the answer is not very muchor none at all,
i.e. if there is low condence. When this is included as a right-hand side
variable along with the other regressors in column (2) of Table 1, there is
a negative and signicant correlation between condence in government and
having a positive attitude towards tax compliance.
To check that it is lack of condence in government that matters rather
than trust in general, the answer on justiable cheating can also be related
to the standard trust question which is asked in the survey: Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant
be too careful in dealing with people?where the answer is coded as one
if the respondent says that you cannot be too careful.11 Table 1, column
(3) shows that lack of trust in general is not signicantly correlated with
believing that cheating on taxes is justiable. This emphasizes that the
answer to this question is related to lack of condence in government rather
than lack of trust in general.12
Although this serves only to o¤er further motivation for the model that
follows, the results from the World Values Survey are quite consistent and
link attitudes to tax compliance with condence in government.13
11Cook et al. (2005) emphasize the need to separate trust in general from condence in
government.
12This is true in spite of the fact that low condence in government and low trust in
people are strongly positively correlated with each other.
13Besley and Mueller (2019) extend these results to other attitudinal data and nd
similar results.
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3 The Core Model
The core model gives a role to intrinsic reciprocity in fostering tax compli-
ance. It partitions the citizens into an elite, with decision-making power
over transfers and a public good, and citizens who pay taxes to fund these
expenditures. Civic-minded citizens receive positive or negative utility from
tax compliance depending on whether the state spends on the public good
or transfers. This allows government policy choices to feedback onto scal
capacity.
Basics Time is innite and indexed by s = 1, 2, ... and at each date a
continuum of citizens of size one is alive. We view each time period as a
generation with a fresh set of agents being born each period.14 All citizens
have the same level of private income, w, generated from labor earnings.
There are three groups of citizens denoted by ω ∈ {E,M, V }. A fraction
e < 1 of the population is a part of group E, a governing E lite which chooses
policy. The non-elite citizens are partitioned into two groups whereM stands
for Materialist, and V for ciV ic-minded or V irtuous. At date s,
a fraction µs of non-elite citizens is civic-minded. We assume that µs ∈[
µ, µ
]
where µ is an irreducible fraction of materialists who are not open to
socialization and µ is an irreducible fraction of civic-minded citizens. The
possibility µ > 0 and µ < 1 allows for a society to remain partially materialist
or civic-minded and µ−µ can be thought of as the amount of cultural leverage
in a society.
The utility function of all citizens is linear in public and private goods,
i.e. αG + y, where G is expenditure on a tax-nanced public good and y is
private consumption. The value of the public good is identical for all citizens
and stochastic. Each period it is drawn afresh from the interval [1, A] with
the cumulative distribution function of α being F (α). One way of thinking
about α is capturing a uctuating external threat of war which necessitates
investment in defensive capabilities. Since α > 1, the non-elite always prefer
that tax revenue is spent on the public good rather than adding to private
consumption.
Taxes are levied on the incomes of the non-elite.15 Taxpayers must decide
14To motivate the socialization process, we could also have some economically inactive
children alive in each period who become next periods taxpayers.
15This is convenient since the compliance decisions of the elite can be ignored. However,
this could be added to the model, albeit at the cost of increased complexity.
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what proportion of their income to hide from the tax authorities which we
denote by n ∈ [0, 1] where n stands for non-compliance.
Policy and Institutions We focus for now on a single period of policy-
making dropping any reference to date s. Policy is determined by the elite
and comprises four elements: a tax rate on income, t, spending on the public
good, G, a level of transfer per capita to the non-elite, b, and a level of
transfer per capita to the elite B.
Following Besley and Persson (2011), suppose that institutions constrain
the government to spend σ ∈ [0, 1] on transfers for the non-elite for every
unit of transfer spending on the elite. If σ = 0, then the elite can consume
all of public revenues as transfers with impunity and whereas with σ = 1,
the elite is compelled to share resources equally with the non-elite. As σ
increases, institutions are therefore more cohesive and, as show below, the
state is more likely to spend on the public good.
Substituting b = σB, the government budget constraint can be written
as:
B = θ (σ) [T −G]






e¤ective price of the public good to the elite given that it must forego
a transfer to provide them. Note also that eθ (σ) < 1 and σθ (σ) ≤ 1.
Moreover, θ (1) = 1 for all e ∈ [0, 1]. Note also that b = σB ≤ B, i.e. the
transfer to the non-elite is lower than for the elite whenever σ < 1.
If θ (σ) < 1, there is a conict of interest between elites and non-elites.
Specically, there can be range of α ∈ [1, A] where the elites prefer spending
on transfers rather than on the public good. However, the fact that θ (σ) is
decreasing in σ implies a larger range of α for which the elite prefer spending
on the public good to transfers as σ increases. This logic implies that more
cohesive institutions encourage the elite to spend on the public good as in
Besley and Persson (2009, 2011).
Tax Compliance Non-compliance with taxation may be costly if an indi-
vidual is caught and ned for not paying taxes. We capture this by positing
a non-compliance cost τwC (n), measured in units of private consumption,
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if n > 0
0 otherwise.
The parameter τ indexes detection e¤ort by government and parallels the
strategic investments in coercion of the kind studied in Besley and Persson
(2009, 2011).
Preferences of the taxpaying citizens depend on their tax non-compliance
decision, n, and are given by:
αG+ b+ w [1− (1− n) [t− λ [G− eB]]− τC (n)] . (2)
where λ = 0 for materialists and λ =  > 0 for civic-minded citizens. The
nal term in (2) is utility from earning net of taxes and non-compliance
costs. The term n [G− eB] links tax-compliance compliance decisions to
the pattern of government spending for civic-minded citizens. If G > eB,
then it is as ifnon-compliance is based on a lower tax rate and vice versa
if eB > G. Civic-minded citizens are like motivated agents in the sense
of Besley and Ghatak (2005); they comply with taxes if their preferences as
tax-paying agents are aligned with the principal (in this context the govern-
ment).17 This injects an element of intrinsic reciprocity since tax compliance
is higher when then public good is provided and lower when the elite chooses
to spend on a transfer to itself.
For λ ∈ {0,}, the optimal (non-)compliance decision is given by:
n = arg min
n2[0,1]
{(1− n) [t− λ [G− eB]] + τC (n)}
=
t− λ [G− eB]
τ
(3)
assuming an interior solution. Hence non-compliance is increasing in t and
16For simplicity, we assume that none of the compliance costs that are imposed on
citizens are appropriable as public revenues.
17Key to the formulation is that compliance creates a private benet or cost for civic-
minded citizens.
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B and decreasing in G and τ .18 Let
v
(















It determines the loss in utility from taxation given an optimally chosen level
of non-compliance.
To focus on an interior solution for non-compliance as well as an optimal
tax rate between zero and one, we assume throughout that
τ < 2 and min {2− τ , 1} > w. (5)
This holds if the reciprocal motive is not too strong and coercive power
(a¤ecting the material cost of non-compliance) is su¢ ciently limited.19
Fiscal Capacity Fiscal capacity is dened as the maximum tax revenue
that a government can raise given the civic culture represented by µ and the
coercive power of government given by τ . Tax revenue per capita, given a
tax rate of t and an expenditure mix (G,B), is given by:
T (t, G− eB, µ, τ) = t (1− e)w
[




where, for notational convenience, we have suppressed dependence on e. The
revenue-maximizing tax rate is given by:
t̂ (G− eB, µ, τ) = arg max
t0
{T (t, G− eB, µ, τ)} = 1
2
[τ + µ (G− eB)] .
(7)
Dependence of the tax rate in (7) on the expenditure mix reects the fact that
this a¤ects tax compliance. The revenue-maximizing tax rate is increasing in
the proportion of civic-minded citizens if G > eB and decreasing otherwise.
18It is easy to check that
f̂ (m) = min {max {m, 0} , 1}
is the level of evasion in general and hence at an interior solution f̂ (m) = m.
19See Appendix B for details.
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It is also higher when the government has more enforcement capacity, i.e. τ
is higher.20
Plugging (7) into (6), scal capacity is:
T
(





[τ + µ (G− eB)]2 . (8)
This is increasing and convex in G − eB. It is also increasing in τ but can
be increasing or decreasing in µ depending on the sign of G− eB.
The model suggests a di¤erence between de jure and de facto scal ca-
pacity. The former depends on legal enforcement capacity represented by τ
which a¤ects the material non-compliance cost. This is all that matters for
scal capacity if µ = 0, i.e. all citizens are materialists. In general a higher
value of of τ enables the state to extract greater tax revenues by reducing
non-compliance. The actual level of compliance can depend on government
spending policy if µ > 0. We can think of this as representing higher or
lower tax moralein the language of that literature.
4 Analysis
The model is studied in two steps. First, we study the elites optimal policy
recognizing the dependence of tax revenues on civic culture given in (8). We
then reintroduce the time dimension and study the dynamics of civic culture
driven by the relative payo¤s of the materialists and civic-minded citizens.
4.1 Optimal Policy
Given a realization of α, the elite choose policies constrained by institutions,
σ, civic culture, µ, and enforcement capacity, τ .21 Recognizing that b = σB,
the elites optimal policy, (G,B), maximizes:
αG+B (9)
20Appendix B shows that the parameter restriction in (5) is su¢ cient for an interior
solution for in the non-compliance decisions by both kinds of citizens, i.e. materialist and
civic-minded and for the optimal tax rate.
21This abstracts away from the possibility that elites set policy to inuence µs strategi-









θ (σ) = B. (10)
For any given expenditure mix, the elite will choose the revenue maximizing
tax rate (7). Moreover, we show in Proposition 1 below that the constraint
set is convex so that the elite will choose a corner solution where either G or
B is zero.
Two key magnitudes are the maximal and minimal tax revenues that can
be raised from the non-elite citizens which are given by:
Lemma 1: The maximum and minimum tax revenues, {TH (µ, τ) , TL (µ, τ , σ)}
are characterized as follows:
(i) if all spending is on the public good, then
TH (µ, τ) = τξH (µ)
where ξH (µ) is increasing and,
(ii) if all spending is on transfers, then
TL (µ, τ , σ) = τξL (µ, σ)
where ξL (µ, σ) is a decreasing function of µ and an increasing function
of σ. Moreover, θ (σ) ξL (µ, σ) is decreasing in σ.
This says that taxation is proportional to τ which holds as a consequence
of the quadratic specication of compliance costs. More substantively, the
result says that when µ increases, then civic-minded citizens increase or re-
duce compliance depending on the mix of public spending. This implies a
lower tax revenue when the state is spending on transfers and a higher tax
revenue when it is spending on the public good. Since the transfers to the
elite is decreasing in σ, all else equal, the level of taxation that can be raised
with transfer spending is increasing in σ.
To explore the implications for tax rates, dene
tH (µ, τ) =
τ
2
[1 + µξH (µ)] (11)
and
tL (µ, τ , σ) =
τ
2
[1− µeθ (σ) ξL (µ, σ)] (12)
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as the tax rates when all spending is on the public good (11) or transfers
(12). Together these imply that:
tH (µ, τ) >
τ
2
> tL (µ, τ , σ) . (13)
The signicance of this inequality is that τ/2 is the tax rate that would
prevail if all citizens were materialists. Hence, the e¤ect of having civic-
minded citizens is to increase the revenue-maximizing tax rate when G > 0
and depress it when B > 0. The rate of taxation is higher in an economy
that spends all of its revenues on the public good since civic-minded citizens
comply more with taxes in this case.
The model captures the kind of tax morale argument which is invoked
to understand why Scandinavian countries are able to obtain high levels of
tax compliance even at high marginal rates of taxation. This is because
their governments also provide public goods and citizens respond to that by
reciprocally paying more tax.22 The model explains the logic of the argument
developed in Levi (1988) which forges an explicit link between compliance
and government provision of public goods through history.
We now have the following result describing the conditions under which
di¤erent levels of public spending are chosen:
Proposition 1 Optimal public expenditures depend on the realization of α
given {σ, µ, τ} as follows:
1. If 1 ≥ θ (σ) ξL(µ,σ)
ξH(µ)
, then for α ∈ [1, A], τξH (µ) is spent on the public
good with no transfer spending.
2. If A > θ (σ) ξL(µ,σ)
ξH(µ)
> 1 then then:
(a) for α ≥ θ (σ) ξL(µ,σ)
ξH(µ)
, then τξH (µ) is spent on the public good with
no transfer spending.
(b) for α < θ (σ) ξL(µ,σ)
ξH(µ)
, then θ (σ) τξL (µ, σ) is spent on transfers with
no spending on the public good.
3. If A < θ (σ) ξL(µ,σ)
ξH(µ)
then for α ∈ [1, A], then θ (σ) τξL (µ, σ) is spent on
transfers with no spending on the public good.
22For an interesting discussion along these lines, see Kleven (2014).
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The logic of the result comes from two features of the model. Tax revenue
raised is convex in G− eB while the payo¤ function of the elites is linear in
the public good, G, and the transfer, B.23 Hence, the solution will be for the
elite to spend either on the public good or on transfers. This is governed by
a cuto¤ value of α equal to θ (σ) ξL(µ,σ)
ξH(µ)
with the public good being provided
only if α exceeds this cuto¤. A key ratio is therefore ξL(µ,σ)
ξH(µ)
, i.e. taxes raised
when the government spends on transfers compared to those raised when
spending is on the public good. It is straightforward to see from (8) that
this ratio is equal to one if µ = 0. Moreover, from Lemma 1, we know that
it is less than one for µ > 0. This increases the range of α for which it is
optimal for the elite to spend on the public good. This illustrates how a
stronger civic culture allows citizens to exercise de facto control over how the
government behaves above and beyond constraints imposed by institutions as
represented by σ. A strong civic culture increases the likelihood of spending
on the public good.
Proposition 1 illustrates three possibilities.
In the rst case, there is spending on the public good even if α = 1. This
corresponds to what Besley and Persson (2011) refer to as a common interest
state where the elite follows the policy preferences of the non-elite citizens
for α ∈ [1, A]. This requires a combination of of σ < 1 and µ > 0 since
θ (σ) > 1 whenever σ < 1.
In the second case, the mix of public spending depends upon the realiza-
tion of α. For high α realizations, spending is on the public good while, for
low realizations, it is on transfers. The probability of transfers in this case
is therefore:
ρ (σ, µ) = F
(
θ (σ) ξL (µ, σ)
ξH (µ)
)
∈ [0, 1] , (14)
which, using Lemma 1, is decreasing in µ and σ.
The third case is where tax revenue is spent on transfers regardless of the
realization of α. This corresponds to what Besley and Persson (2011) call a
redistributive state. It is most likely to occur when σ is close to zero and e
is small which make it costly for the elite to spend on the public good. It is
also facilitated by µ being low since there is smaller cost to the elite in terms
of foregone revenue when the civic culture is weak.
23Introducing curvature into the utility function would be straightforward but the in-
sights are less clean.
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4.2 The Dynamics of Civic Culture
We now make µs endogenous by applying an evolutionary model of the type
studied in Sandholm (2010) and Sethi and Somanathan (2001) where the
payo¤ di¤erence between being a civic-minded and materialist citizen a¤ects
the composition of the population. We will show that this converges to
a steady state with either µ = µ or µ = µ. Although we are not specic
about the micro-foundations, we have in mind a socialization process between
parents and children along with some non-assortative matching as spelled
out in Besley and Persson (2019a). But peer-to-peer inuence could also be
important as citizens are inuenced over their life-cycle.
Timing The timing of events in the dynamic model is as follows:
1. There is an initial level of civic-culture µs.
2. Nature determines the value of the public good αs.
3. The elite choose policies: {Gs, Bs, ts}.
4. Citizens choose their compliance decisions ns which determines the level
of tax revenues.
5. Payo¤s are realized.
6. The next generation of citizens is socialized which determines µs+1.
We now describe the exact evolutionary model that we use.
An Evolutionary Dynamic Sandholm (2010) emphasizes two elements
of an evolutionary dynamic that we use: (i) agents do not continually change
their types but do so only sporadically (inertia) and (ii) agents condition these
switches on current behavior and opportunities (myopia). Let UJ (µs, σ) be
the expected utility of being a type J ∈ {M,V } when there is a fraction
µs of civic minded types in the population in the population at date s. An
evolutionary dynamic is based on a revision protocol. Formally, this is a
continuous function ςIJ
(
UV (µs, σ) , U
M (µs, σ) , µs
)
∈ [0, 1] which species a
conditional switch rate from type I to J given the payo¤s and proportion of
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types in the population. Sandholm (2010) suggests a general class of mean
dynamics which yield:
µs+1 − µs = (1− µs) ςMV s − µsςVMs (15)
where
ςIJs > 0 ⇐⇒  (µs, σ) ≡ U I (µs, σ)− UJ (µs, σ) > 0.
This class of dynamics is convenient since they depend only on comparisons
of the payo¤of one type with the potential payo¤from being the other type.24
The essential ingredient which drives the results is that the type with the
highest expected payo¤ will replicate faster.
Cultural Fitness To understand the dynamics of civic culture, we need
to explore how the fraction of civic minded types a¤ects this expected utility
di¤erence between civic-minded and materialist citizens denoted by  (µ, σ).





sition 1, the utility of a non-elite citizen is:












Using Proposition 1, the expected utility di¤erence between being a civic-
minded and materialist citizen is given by:









tL (µ, τ , σ)
τ
+ eθ (σ) ξL (µ, σ)
)]











− ξH (µ, σ)
)]
.(16)
We will refer to (16) as the cultural tness advantage/disadvantage of civic-
minded citizens. It has two parts, the rst referring to the case when there
24The specication in (15) includes the replicator dynamic as a special case when
ςMV s = µsmax
{[





ςVMs = (1− µs)max
{[






is spending on transfers and the second to that where there is spending on
the public good.
The following property of (16) is useful in what follows:
Lemma 2: The cultural tness advantage of civic-minded citizens,  (µ, σ), is
increasing in µ and σ.
Both of these properties make intuitive sense. As either µ or σ increases,
then the set of realizations of α for which the public good is provided also
increases. This, in turn, increases the utility of civic-minded citizens relative
to materialists as they have higher (lower) payo¤s when the public good
(transfers) are provided by government.
Lemma 2 implies that there is a complementarity between µs and µs+1−
µs; having more (fewer) civic-minded citizens increases (decreases) the cul-
tural tness advantage of civic-minded citizens.25
Steady-States Since, from Lemma 1,  (µ, σ) is increasing in µ, any rea-
sonable notion of stability implies that any interior steady-state will be un-
stable and hence that only µ = µ or µ = µ are possible long-run outcomes.26
This observation is reected in:









, the steady state is µ = µ.




, the steady state is µ = µ.








which is decreasing in σ such that the steady state is µ = µ if and only
if µ0 ≥ µ̂ (σ).
There are three cases. In case 1 then, even with µ = µ, the probability of
spending on the public good is high enough to create a cultural tness advan-
tage for civic-minded citizens. A maximally strong civic culture then evolves




> 0 implies that  (µ, σ) > 0 for all µ ≥ µ. Thus
25Note this comes even without there being a direct externality in tax compliance de-
cisions between citizens where cheating by one citizen begets cheating by another. This
could, of course, be added to the model as an additional source of complementarity.
26Specically, we consider small deviations around the steady µ± ν for ν > 0.
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the dynamic complementarity ensures that the cultural tness advantage of
civic-minded citizens increases over time. The ip-side is true in the second
case where civic-minded citizens have a cultural tness disadvantage with µ.
This means that the range of α realizations for which there is spending on the
public good is likely to be narrow. The third case illustrates the possibility of





which  (µ, σ) > 0 and below which  (µ, σ) < 0. The starting point then
a¤ects which steady state occurs. The models dynamic complementarity
implies hysteresis where societies that begin with a strong civic culture build
on it whereas those with a weak civic culture lose it. Even if we suppose
that every society begins with only materialists, i.e. µ0 = µ = 0, Proposition
2 emphasizes that a civic culture can still emerge in this case if σ is large
enough.
The third case in Proposition 2 emphasizes that the starting point, µ0,
can play a role in determining the long-run outcome. For many countries
which began life following a period of colonialism, this could be an inheri-
tance from their colonial history. Civic culture could also be inuenced by
migration of citizens from locations where a civic culture has already been
developed. The initial civic culture could also be inherited from prior experi-
ence of government in small-scale societies. Some forms of community-based
government may have encouraged a civic culture creating an initial endow-
ment which is inuential when a central state is formed so that µ0 > µ.
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Proposition 2 emphasizes that inherited cultures need not however be sus-
tainable in the long-run depending on the cohesiveness of institutions and
the strength of common interests.
5 Core Implications
This section draws out three implications of the framework for the evolu-
tion of civic culture and state capacity. The rst shows how institutional
cohesiveness and civic culture are complements. The second shows how
the structure of common interests shapes how civic culture, and hence scal
capacity, evolves. This provides a link to debates about the relationship
between civic-culture and national emergencies such as the threat of an ex-
ternal war. Finally, the model is extended to allow citizens to have a say
27This argument is elaborated in section 6 below.
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in choosing which elites hold o¢ ce, forging a link between the dynamics of
state capacity, civic culture and extension of the franchise.
5.1 Cohesiveness of Institutions
The fact that  (µ, σ) is increasing in σ (Lemma 2) encapsulates the idea
that, when the government is more constrained not to use the state for trans-
fer purposes, this enhances the cultural tness of civic-minded citizens. This
generates a natural complementarity between institutional cohesiveness and
civic culture which we now bring out.
Consider two di¤erent values of cohesiveness represented by σ ∈ {σL, σH}
where σL < σH . This could be the same polity at two di¤erent dates, as in
England before and after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, or two di¤erent
polities that di¤er in the form of institutions for constraining power such as
Argentina and the USA in 1910.28
To create a stark implication of institutional di¤erences for the develop-
ment of civic culture, suppose that for µ0 ∈ [0, 1], we have:
 (µ0, σH) > 0 >  (µ0, σL) .
29 (17)
If (17) holds, then Proposition 2 yields:
Proposition 3 Suppose that (17) holds at µ0, then a polity with σH con-
verges to µ = µ and a polity with σL converges to µ = µ.
This result illustrates the complementarity between institutions and civic-
culture in the model. A combination of weak institutions (low σ) and a weak
initial civic culture (low µ) can together undermine the prospects for scal
capacity and civic-culture to grow.
The result can be used to think about what happens in a country following
an institutional reform which enhances constraints on executive power. The
framework suggests that direct benets in the form of more public good
provision may be accompanied by indirect benets if the incentive to build
civic culture is also enhanced. We can think of this as a kind of institutional
28According to the Madison data project https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-
project-database-2018 the ratio of US and Argentinian GDP per capita in 1910 was about
1.13. According to the executive constraints variable (xconst) in the PolityIV data from
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html the the USA is coded with xconst equal
to 7 (the highest possible score) while Argentina is coded with xconst equal to 4.
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reform multiplieron scal capacity due to the dynamics of civic culture. In
her historical account, Levi (1988) emphasizes the fact that increasing quasi-
voluntary compliance was enhanced by institutional reforms which meant
that governments became more constrained in ways that increased provision
of public goods.
Proposition 3 emphasizes that reforms may only be e¤ective if they are
su¢ ciently large to take a polity above a tipping point of the form implicit
in (17). Small reforms are more likely to have an impact when µ0, the value
at the point of reform, is close to µ̂ (σ) as dened in Proposition 2. This
insight could be important if the analysis were extended to consider purposive
institutional reform of the kind studied in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
5.2 Strength of Common Interests
The distribution of α represents the extent of common interests between the
elites and non-elites since high α will tend to give them the same objectives for
government as emphasized by Besley and Persson (2009). We can, therefore,
think of the distribution of α as a measure of common interests which may
di¤er across countries and over time. The ebb and ow of external threats
to a country is a case in point and has been emphasized as a driver of scal
capacity by historical sociologists such as Hintze (1906) and Tilly (1990).
Here we discuss how this can inuence civic culture.30
To illustrate the consequences of this, let κ index the distribution of α,
i.e. F (α : κ) with Fκ (α : κ) < 0, so that an increase in κ yields a rst-order
stochastic dominating shift in the demand for the public good. Variation
in κ can capture di¤erences in exposure to an external threat. Since the







on κ, we now also index the cultural tness advantage by κ. Formally,
 (µ, σ, κ) is increasing in κ since ρ (σ, µ, κ) is decreasing in κ. This implies
that there is a stronger incentive to develop a civic culture if κ increases
since, all else equal, it is more likely that the public good is provided (cf
Proposition 1).
Consider two values of κ ∈ {κl, κh} with κh > κl such that for the initial
condition µ0 ∈ [0, 1], we have
 (µ0, σ, κh) > 0 >  (µ0, σ, κl) . (18)
30See Bauer et al. (2016) for a discussion of the cultural legacy of warfare.
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If this holds then whether a polity has strong or weak common interests as
measured by κ, has an impact on state capacity and the strength of the civic
culture. The following result parallels Proposition 3:
Proposition 4 Suppose that (18) holds at µ0, then a polity with κh converges
to µ = µ and a polity with κl converges to µ = µ.
This result o¤ers an interesting twist on the Hintze-Tilly hypothesis on
the importance of war in the development of a scal state adding an addi-
tional dimension in the form of civic culture. The model shows that a higher
external threat will enhance scal capacity depending on {µ0, σ, κ}. A coun-
try with an initially weak civic culture may not move to a path where scal
capacity expands even though the war threat increases if  (µ0, σ, κh) < 0
which is likely to be the case if the initial civic culture and/or institutions are
weak. This provides a possible explanation for the claim that the Hintze-
Tilly hypothesis has little predictive power in some contexts. For example,
this argued by Centeno (1997) for the Latin American context where he
argues that external war threat was not an engine of state development.
A positive shock to κ could also reect investments by government which
increase bureaucratic e¢ ciency or reduce corruption; these would increase the
e¤ective provision of the public good for a given outlay. Our observation that
this can a¤ect civic culture squares with the observation in Levi and Sacks
(2009) that having a competent bureaucracy can increase quasi-voluntary
compliance.
5.3 Representative Institutions and Selection of Elites
We have supposed so far that policy is always controlled by an homogenous
entrenched elite. We now allow the possibility that there are competing elites
with heterogeneous preferences for the public good. This will allow us to
think about what happens when non-elites have a greater say in who governs
them.
Heterogeneous Elites To x ideas, suppose that the value of the public
good among non-elite citizens is always A > 1. The stochastic draws of the
value of the public good therefore apply only to the elites and a¤ect their
policy choices. Their valuation is drawn from a distribution F (α : κ) where
α ∈ [1, A] and an increase in κ induces rst-order stochastic dominance.
24
To capture heterogeneity in elite preferences very simply, assume that
there are two groups within the elite denoted by l and h, with type h elites
closer in their preference for the public good to the non-elite citizens captured
by κh > κl. Let γ ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the elite is of type h and
assume that elites compete for power with each elite group represented by
a citizen-candidate who faithfully represents the interest of their group
when in power.31 Finally, let eJ be the fraction of the elite population
of type J ∈ {l, h} with e = eh + el. A further state variable will now
be the group-identity of the elite in power at date s. That elite groups
representative will choose policy based on their groups realization of α.
Modied Timing The timing of the model is now modied to include the
determination of the elites type and becomes:
1. There is an initial level of civic-culture µs.
2. The type of the new elite is determined for period s with γ being the
probability that the elite is of type h.
3. Nature determines the value of the public good, αs.
4. The elite choose policies: {Gs, Bs, ts}.
5. Citizens choose their compliance decisions ns which determines the level
of tax revenues.
6. Payo¤s are realized.
7. The next generation of citizens are socialized which determines µs+1.
The timing suppose that the realization of αs occurs after the elite has
been chosen.
31See Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) for models based on
this idea.
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Public Good Provision Using the analysis in Proposition 1, the proba-
bility of transfer spending when the probability that the elite is of type h is
γ is given by
ρ (µ, σ, γ) = γF
(











The transfer regime is less likely if the polity is represented by a type h elite
group member, if the civic culture is stronger and if institutions are more
cohesive.
Choice of Elites We now discuss how γ can be determined endogenously
using a very simply model. Note rst that if there was no randomness and
the non-elite citizens could choose which group to have in power before the
realization of αs, they would unanimously prefer a type h elite member and
we would γ = 1. We can think of γ as therefore indexing how far the
non-elite citizens preferences are represented in the selection process which
could reect franchise extension as modeled by, for example, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004).
To be specic, suppose that in each period, there is a contest for power
between a representative of the h and l elites and that the group with more
support wins. Moreover, suppose that there is a pro-h shockχ ∈ [−e, e]
with symmetric distribution function K (·). This shock can be thought of
as representing non-economic factors such as the relative charisma or per-
suasiveness of the candidate put up by each group. So even a group h elite
member may favour the group l member and vice versa.
Let φ ∈ [0, 1] index how much inuence non-elite citizens have in choosing
who holds power. They will always support the group h candidate. Assum-
ing that the group with highest level of support holds o¢ ce, then the group
h will hold power if eh + φ [1− e] + χ ≥ el. Then
γ = K (eh − el + φ (1− e))
is the probability that a type h elite member controls policy. This is in-
creasing in φ so that greater representation of the views of non-elites in the
selection process increases the chance of a type h elite group member con-
trolling policy. Moreover, φ̂ such that γ = 1 for all φ ≥ φ̂ as long as e < 1/3.
If φ and eh are small then group l elites will tend to dominate policy making
with γ close to zero.
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Implications The cultural tness advantage of civic-minded citizens will
now be a function of γ through (19) since the selection process of the elite
group a¤ects the probability that expenditure will be on the public good
rather than transfers. We capture this by writing this as  (µ, σ, γ) which
is an increasing function of γ.
Now consider two values of γ ∈ {γl, γh} where γh > γl to represent
varying levels of non-elite representation in the political process either in
di¤erent polities or following a reform within a polity. Suppose that for µ0 ∈
[0, 1] we have:
 (µ0, σ, γh) > 0 >  (µ0, σ, γl) . (20)
This is implied by (18) if γh and γl are far enough apart. We now have a
parallel result to Propositions 3 and 4:
Proposition 5 Suppose that (20) holds at µ0, then a polity with γh converges
to µ = µ and a polity with γl converges to µ = µ.
This result shows how a democratic reform towards greater participation
in political selection can change the direction of civic culture and scal ca-
pacity. However, as in the case of reforms to cohesiveness, this is more likely
with non-marginal reforms and is more likely when close to µ̂ (σ) as dened in
Proposition 2. Thus the impact of a reform can be heterogeneous according
to context.
6 Further Insights
This section explores some additional implications of the model. We rst
discuss what happens when di¤erent civic traditions from heterogenous com-
munities are merged together. Second, we discuss aid dependence and nat-
ural resources. Third, we discuss some alternative ways of thinking about
socialization and cultural transmission.
Bottom-up State Building Reciprocity is most often invoked as a feature
of small-scale societies and local communities. Moreover, modern states
were often built from the ground up by merging heterogenous communities.
The USA merged together states with cultural origins and the UK is a forged
from a variety of countries with their own political traditions and institutions.
This consideration opens up the possibility that strong local cultures could
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help in building a centralized state. Moreover, the framework developed in
this paper is useful in thinking about this process.
Suppose therefore that there are two di¤erent communities indexed by
J ∈ {1, 2} with each comprising an elite group and a set of non-elite citizens.
Let the communities be identical except for the quality of institutions that
regulate how public resources, i.e. there is σJ for J ∈ {1, 2} and suppose that
these di¤erences are exogenously given. At any date s > 0 let µJs represent
the civic culture in community J and suppose that µJ0 = µ = 0, i.e. both
communities begin with purely materialistic cultures. If institutions in the
two communities di¤er such that  (0, σ1) > 0 >  (0, σ2), then Proposition
3 implies that the civic cultures will diverge and, after a period of time,
µ1s > µ
2
s = 0, i.e. the community with more cohesive institutions will develop
a stronger civic culture.
Now consider what would happen if the two communities were to merge
and decision-making over taxes and public spending across the two commu-
nities were unied as a result. To study the merged polity, assume that the
aggregate civic culture has µs = ϕµ
1
s where ϕ ∈ [0, 1] is the population share
of community 1. For institutions, suppose that σ = βσ1 + (1− β)σ2 where
β = 1 is the optimistic case where the most cohesive institutions are adopted
centrally while β = 0 is the opposite case.
The merger creates the possibility of positive and negative externalities
between the communities which a¤ect the subsequent evolution of civic cul-
ture. A su¢ cient statistic for this is the sign of  (ϕµ1s, βσ1 + (1− β)σ2)
which is the cultural tness advantage of the civic-minded citizens in the
merged polity. A successful merger in scal capacity terms, can then be
dened as a case where
 (ϕµ1s, βσ1 + (1− β)σ2) > 0,
so that the merged community now has an incentive to build a strong civic
culture and community 1 creates a positive externality for community 2.
This is more likely if β is close to one. An unsuccessful merger would be
characterized by
0 >  (ϕµ1s, βσ1 + (1− β)σ2) .
Now community 2 inicts a negative externality on community 1 shows civic
culture erodes over time.
These considerations illustrate the risk associated with merging civic cul-
tures from di¤erent countries to form nation states. Moreover, there is
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evidence that articial mergers of ethnic groups into contrived nation states
has more often than not result in lower levels of public good provision as ar-
gued, for example, by Alesina et al. (1999) and study in terms of pre-colonial
institutions by Papaioannou and Michalopoulos (2013).
Natural Resources and/or Aid-dependence The model focuses on tax
revenues from incomes. But a feature of many low-income countries and
weakly institutionalized polities is high dependence on natural resource roy-
alties and aid ows to fund the government. Moreover, there is now a sizeable
literature emphasizing the economic and political disadvantages of natural
resource dependence (for example, Sachs and Warner, 2001, and Ross, 2015)
We now show natural resources can a¤ect scal capacity via its impact
on civic culture. To do so, let non-tax revenues per capita be denoted by R.
This implies that tax revenues on income are comparatively less important
and the critical ratio of α (from Proposition 1) which determines whether
spending is on the public good or transfers is modied to:
α><θ (σ)
[
R + τξL (µ, σ)
R + τξH (µ)
]
. (21)
The right hand side of (21) is increasing in R implying that greater natural
resource revenue increase the range of α for which the state spends on trans-
fers for any given value of µ. This weakens the inuence of civic culture on
government spending behavior since income tax compliance is relatively less
important.
The probability that a government will spend on transfers is now given
by:




R + τξL (µ, σ)
R + τξH (µ)
])
(22)
which is also increasing in R. This in turn a¤ects the cultural tness advan-
tage of civic-minded citizens. Specically this now depends on R, and hence
is denoted by  (µ, σ,R), which is decreasing in R. This is because with a
higher probability of transfer spending, there is a smaller tness advantage
to civic-minded citizens.
To illustrate the implication of natural resources for the emergence of
civic culture, suppose that two polities di¤er only in respect of their levels of
non-tax revenues from natural resources R ∈ {RL, RH} where RH > RL for
which that:
 (µ0, σ, RL) > 0 >  (µ0, σ, RH) , (23)
29
for µ0 ∈ [0, 1]. Now, using the logic of Proposition 3, a polity with low
natural resources, RL, converges to µ = 1 while a polity with high natural
resources, RH , converges to µ = 0.
This argument adds a new twist to the literature on the resource curse
showing how natural resources can have an impact on civic culture. This
weakness of civic culture presents particular challenges for countries with
dwindling natural resources or where aid is being cut back. Even if this
increases the incentive to spend on public goods, if they lack a strong so-
cial contract based on reciprocal obligation, raising tax revenue may be a
challenge.
The Nature of Cultural Transmission The approach taken here sup-
poses that it is utility rather than material payo¤s that drive cultural trans-
mission. This contrasts with a more standard economic view where the only
observable tness signal comes from material payo¤s, i.e. the consumption
that each type enjoys which is given by:















where x = 0 for materialists and x =  [G− eB] for civic-minded citizens.
The fact that Ŷ (x) is maximized at x = 0 reects the fact that civic-minded
citizens always have lower material payo¤s and hence:
 (µ, σ) = ρ (µ, σ) Ŷ (τξH (µ))+(1− ρ (µ, σ)) Ŷ (−eθ (σ) τξL (µ, σ))−Ŷ (0) < 0.
This is true since civic-minded citizens only receive a utility benet from pay-
ing more taxes if they have higher non-material payo¤s. Cultural evolution
based on material payo¤s would imply that no civic culture would emerge.
This observation could be used to motivate an upper bound on µ if some of
the non-elite citizens always care only about money or if there is diminishing
marginal utility of private consumption.
As an alternative source of intrinsic motivation, Besley and Persson (2019a)
explore the emergence of environmentalism using an approach based on Ben-
abou and Tirole (2006) where agents use their consumption decisions to signal
to others and earn social esteem from pro-social behavior. The approach in
this paper emphasises that what creates esteem can vary, i.e. whether paying
taxes is deemed to be pro-socialcould depend on whether the state it is
providing the public good.
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The model of cultural evolution used here makes socialization depend on
expected utilities conditional on µs. This di¤ers from strategic forward-
looking socialization as in Bisin and Verdier (2001). However, as Besley and
Persson (2019a,b) show, with a fewer stronger assumptions, the current ap-
proach can include forward looking socialization without any material change
in the results.32
7 Concluding Comments
This paper has explored the interplay between civic culture, e¤ective gover-
nance and state capacity. The proposed framework captures the role of civic
culture in encouraging voluntary compliance. Intrinsic reciprocity between
the state and its citizens evolves based on the relative payo¤s of materialists
and civic-minded citizens. The analysis models an evolving social contract
where tax compliance is linked to the provision of a public good.
The framework has two important complementarities which a¤ect the
dynamic path that a polity takes. First, a society with a strong (weak)
civic culture encourages provision of public goods which increases (decreases)
the payo¤ of civic-minded citizens relative to materialists. Thus weak or
strong civic-cultures are mutually reinforcing. This feature of the model can
generate multiple steady states leading to hysteresis with eventual outcome
depending on the initial conditions. The second complementarity comes
from cohesive institutions constraining government and therefore favoring
civic-minded citizens over materialists. Governments who lack constraints
will tend to disappoint their civic-minded citizens leading to an erosion in
civic culture over time. Making elites more accountable to their citizens can
also foster the emergence of a stronger civic culture.
There are many potential avenues for future development. Exploring
more dimensions of state capacity such as laws and regulations would be
interesting. A direct role for due process in generating compliance and
civic culture is important in this context as would be the process by which
government policy is made. A greater role for heterogeneity and polarization
is also important. There are many potential applications of cultural change
to politics. For example, Besley and Persson (2019b) try to explain the rise
32The essentials of the analysis are preserved as long as the the evolutionary model is
governed by a di¤erence equation which has a root in the unit interval.
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of identity politics in terms of the cultural tness advantage to citizens with
nationalistic rather than cosmopolitan views.
The model of elite selection above assumed that the elite were exogenously
partitioned into groups with high and low public spending priorities so that
some were closer to what non-elite citizens wanted. But the size of these
groups could be made endogenous by considering the relative payo¤s of the
di¤erent kinds of elites. When the political elite comes to power in elections,
they have an incentive to develop norms and values which make them faithful
servants of non-elite citizens as long as they gain an electoral advantage from
doing so. Greater prestige from holding power might then help to nurture
an elite who had a stronger ethic of public service.
We have abstracted away from e¤orts by government to a¤ect culture
strategically. If the government is strategic, and especially if it can commit,
it could take into account how policy changes µs+1.
33 The body of evidence
that educated individuals are more likely to engage in civic activities such as
volunteering (see, for example, Dee, 2004, and Milligan et al. 2004) which
opens up the possibility that governments spending resources on civic edu-
cation in order to change µs+1 directly.
The paper has also taken political institutions as given. But it would be
interesting to explore institutional and cultural dynamics jointly. Besley and
Persson (2018) build on the strategic approach of Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) and argue that democratization and democratic values are comple-
ments. There is much more to do to explore the coevolution of culture and
political institutions.34
33See Besley and Persson (2019a) for discussion of how policy commitment and forward
looking government action could inuence the trajectory of environmental values.
34See, for example, Acemgolu and Robinson (2018) and Bisin and Verdier (2017).
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X̂ (A, b) = A
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]
= ξL (µ, σ) .
for µ 6= 0. It is straightforward to verify that for µ > 0, then ξH (µ) is
increasing in µ and ξL (µ, σ) is increasing in σ and decreasing in µ. Moreover:
∂θ (σ) ξL (µ, σ)
∂σ
=
θσ (σ) ξL (µ, σ)
1 + (1 e)w
2
[1− µeθ (σ) ξL (µ, σ)] eθ (σ)µ
< 0.
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(τ + µ [G− eB]) > 0. Moreover,
1− eB̂0 (G) = 1− eθ (σ)
[1 + θ (σ) e  (G− eB)] .
Then, using this, note that:
B̂00 (G) = θ (σ)
[1 + θ (σ) e]2
[1 + θ (σ) e  (G− eB)]3
 0 (G− eB) > 0.
Substituting (10) into (9), the choice of G maximizes the following convex
function:
αG+ B̂ (G)
and hence yields a corner solution at either G = 0 or G = TH (µ, τ). Hence
we can now compare αTH (µ, τ) and θ (σ)TL (µ, τ , σ) which yields the three
cases in the Proposition. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Begin from (16) and (14). Now rst consider the
e¤ect of a change in µ. Note that ρ (σ, µ) is decreasing in µ and
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which are both positive. Together these imply that  (µ, σ) is increasing in
µ.
How about dependence on σ? First note that ρ (σ, µ) is decreasing in σ.
Then
σ (µ, σ) = ρσ (σ, µ)w [δL (µ, σ)− δH (µ)] +
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+ eθ (σ) ξL (µ, σ)
)]




1− tL (µ, τ , σ)
τ





which is negative since ∂ξL(µ,σ)
∂σ
> 0 and ∂tL(µ,τ ,σ)
∂σ
> 0 from (12). 
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove this, we start from
µs+1 − µs = (1− µs) ςVM − µsςMV . (25)
Note that if  (µ, σ) > 0 for all µ ∈ [0, 1] then ςVM > 0 and ςMV ≤ 0 and (25)
is positive so µ converges to one globally. The opposite is true if  (µ, σ) < 0
for all µ ∈ [0, 1]. Now consider the case where there exists µ̂ (σ) such that
 (µ̂ (σ) , σ) = 0. Then from Lemma 1 since  (µ, σ) is globally increasing
for µ ∈ [0, 1] , then at  (µ̂ (σ) , σ) = 0, we must have µs+1 − µs ≥ 0 for all
1 ≥ µ ≥ µ̂, while µs+1 − µs < 0 for all 0 ≤ µ < µ̂. The interior steady state
is therefore unstable. Moreover since  (µ, σ) is globally increasing implies
that if  (1, σ) ≥ 0 ≥  (0, σ) . Hence
µs+1 − 1 + ν = (1− ν) ςVM − νςMV > 0
µt+1 − ν = νςVM − (1− ν) ςMV < 0
for small enough ν > 0. This implies that the steady states at µ = 0 and
µ = 1 are stable. 
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Proofs of Propositions 3, 4, & 5 The argument is essentially identical
for all three Propositions. Hence, we give the proof only for Proposition 3.
Since (17) holds, then from (15), then for µ = µ0, if σ = σH , then µ1 > µ0 and
since  is increasing in µ, then µs+1 > µs for all s > 1. A similar argument
holds in reverse for µ = µ0 and σ = σL which implies that µs+1 − µs < 1 for
all s > 0. 
B Conditions for an interior solution
For compliance to be at an interior solution, we require that
0 <
t− µ (G− eB)
τ
< 1 (26)




[τ + µ (G− eB)] < 1. (27)














The rst condition holds for all t ∈ [0, 1] if w < 1 which is implied
by (5). For the second condition, we require that this holds when t =
1
2

















or 2− τ > w which is also implied by (5).
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Figure 1: Taxes and the Share of Income Tax Over Time 
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Number of Observations 303229 303229 303229 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is based on question “Is it justifiable to cheat on your taxes if you have a chance?” from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey (various waves) with the scale reversed 
so that the highest score is associated with cheating not being justified.  All specifications include wave and country dummies with standard errors clustered at the country level.  The data cover 104 countries.  
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.  For income: Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes 
that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. For confidence: I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Use answers on “government in capital”.  Coded 1 if answer is “Not very much” or 
“None at all”.  Generalized Trust: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Coded 1 if “You cannot be too careful” 
Table 1: Determinants of Attitudes Towards Tax Compliance 
